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1. Introduction 
Property Rights Dynamics is a collection of essays edited by Donatella Porrini and 
Giovanni Ramello on various topics in property rights theories from notable scholars of 
the field. The chapters are grouped into three parts. Part I concerns some new theories 
of property rights, Part II is about various aspects of extending the property paradigm 
to human body and intellectual property, and Part III covers related issues such as 
competition law, marital property and sleeping owners. The focus on the dynamics of 
property rights offers a useful reference point for those interested in studying the 
evolving boundaries of property rights. 
The book opens with an introductory chapter by Donatella Porrini and Giovanni 
Ramello titled “Property rights dynamics: Current issues in law and economics” which 
provides an overview of property rights theories and the research questions discussed in 
the collection. Porrini and Ramello note that in many human societies de facto property 
rights predate de jure property rights, and property rights appear regularly whenever the 
problem of rival uses is manifested. However despite the regular occurrences of a 
property rights concept, the actual nature of property rights varies widely across 
different social groups and time periods, and thus no single universal definition for 
property rights exists. Indeed, the design, allocation and enforcement of property rights 
often involve a complex set of issues that different societies managed in a variety of 
ways. Changes over time in the demands of society require corresponding redefining of 
the nature of property rights. As such, the history of property rights is a dynamic and 
ever-changing one. To study and understand the precise functions of property rights, 
the best we could accomplish is to take snapshots of a given time and socio-economic 
condition. 
In Western society, property rights are seen as necessary devices for preserving 
individual liberties and for facilitating market exchanges. Following Coase (1960), 
property rights are generally acknowledged to play an important role in attaining 
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efficiency by correcting market failures and making private and public interests meet. 
Coase’s discovery has also led to the belief that property rights is the “right”, and 
probably the only solution for tackling any market failures in whatever context they 
might appear. 
Nevertheless, some critics point out that this interpretation of Coase has given 
rise to rent-seeking opportunities, particularly in the context of intellectual property, 
with the consequence of an overall negative impact on social welfare. Therefore, it is 
important to pay a greater attention to the nature of the new subject matters of property 
rights, the economic context in which they are enforced, as well as how they affect the 
market structure and behaviours of the relevant economic agents. A proper 
understanding of the various idiosyncratic features of property rights can bear great 
insights on the divergence between theory and real-world economic implications. 
2. Functional Property and Entropy 
The second chapter, “The fall and rise of functional property”, by Francesco 
Parisi retraces the history of property rights from ancient to modern times. According 
to him, in the beginning all properties were in the commons. When human population 
increased and resources became scarce, conflicts among competing resource use 
happened more frequently. Hence, the concept of property rights was born to 
overcome such conflicts. Parisi argues that the property rights regime in land was not 
uniform throughout history, but changes from a functional regime to a spatial regime, 
and back and forth again. When property rights first arose, the rights were functional. 
For example, overlapping uses of land are allowed, depending on the use and the person 
using it. Thus the hunter holds hunting privileges and the livestock breeder holds 
grazing rights over the same parcel of land. As time passed, in an agricultural economy, 
the functional property regime was abandoned in favour of a spatial property regime, 
where a single owner holds all rights pertaining to a defined piece of land. During the 
feudal era, property rights in land were not absolute, but dependent upon one’s position 
in the feudal hierarchy of the claimant. Only the tenant in demesne had possessory rights of 
the land, while all the other parties served as intermediaries in the collection of fees and 
granting of services and protection. In the eighteenth century, with the rise of 
industrialisation and the closing of the feudal era, fragmentation of property rights came 
to an end. The codified civil law ensures unity in functional, physical and legal aspects of 
land property. Only those property rights that are recognised by the legal system may be 
created and transacted, even though this restriction conflicted and curtailed the freedom 
to contract. Parisi’s explanation for this rise of unity in property rights is that it is to 
prevent entropy in property rights—a topic which is covered by the same author in 
another chapter in this book. 
Although Parisi’s account deals with real property, the historical lesson of the 
functional property regime should not be lost, since it could shed much light even on 
intellectual property rights. It can be said that intellectual property exhibits less unity in 
property rights compared to real property. Apart from having fewer restrictions on how 
intellectual property rights may be licensed or assigned to different parties, non-
contractees may also stake claim to the use of an intellectual property without consent, 
as long as that use falls within a set of ‘functions’. Under the American doctrine of fair 
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the activity falls within what the courts and the law consider as fair use.
3 In English 
copyright law, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 prescribes a catalogue of 
situations where use of a copyrighted work is permitted without prior consent when 
certain conditions are satisfied. Therefore, it can be concluded that areas of intellectual 
property rights such as copyright, and to some extent patent, allow encroachment by 
other users based on the nature of the use, and hence, the functional property regime is 
an apt characterisation of this aspect of the property rights. 
The basic idea behind Francesco Parisi’s second contribution titled “Entropy and 
the asymmetric Coase theorem” is that over time, property rights fragment into multiple 
ownerships, i.e. entropy. This is due to asymmetric costs between breaking a property 
up and recombining various fragments together. It is to be noted that fragmentation 
could happen physically as in partitioning a plot of land into smaller plots, as well as 
functionally or legally as in granting control over different aspects of a property to 
separate individuals. Parisi observes that legal systems develop various mechanisms to 
combat entropy in property rights. For example, recording systems forfeit unrecorded 
claims against innocent third party purchasers. The use of liability rules remedy such as 
damages on atypical rights is a case in point. Non-conforming property arrangements 
may be subjected to time limitations, whereby at the limitations come into force, the 
non-conforming property reverts back to the original owner. 
The US Supreme Court decision of New York Times v. Tasini is a good example of 
using a liability rule to solve a fragmented property problem. In that case, newspaper 
publishers licensed articles written by independent writers to be published in the print 
version of their newspapers, without explicitly including the licence to reproduce articles 
from the newspapers in electronic form. When newspaper publishers started to include 
the articles in electronic databases, the plaintiffs sought compensation for copyright 
infringement. The majority of the Supreme Court decided for the plaintiffs but awarded 
only compensation but no injunction against the copiers. This allows publishers to 
continue using the articles without having to negotiate with thousands of individual 
authors under the threat of getting an incomplete database.
4 
3. Incomplete Property 
Antonio Nicita extends the concept of incomplete contract, developed in New 
Institutional Economics, to property, giving birth to the concept of incomplete 
property. The chapter titled “On incomplete property: A missing perspective in law and 
economics?” defines incomplete property in two senses of the term: property rights are 
not completely defined, and secondly, enforcement of rights is not always possible. 
Nicita explains this incompleteness in efficiency terms. The core of the property rights 
over well-defined uses ensures certainty and promotes efficient usage of the property. In 
the periphery, uses are rivalrous in nature and property rights are only to be determined 
ex post, to save on ex ante transaction costs. 
                                                 
3  On the economic reasoning for fair use, see Gordon (1982). 
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Careful examination of property law does indeed reveal the nature of this 
incompleteness. Novel conflicts and claims over property rights are only established 
upon adjudication, while commonly exercised rights are usually laid down in statutes. 
Hence, incomplete property necessitates some form of judge-made law, whether the 
legal system is common law or civil law. Incomplete property can also be observed in 
copyright law. Apart from well-established rights, such as the right to control 
reproduction, the American copyright doctrine of fair use allows the judiciary to carve 
out specific exemptions to copyright protection—in essence, removing a copyright 
owner’s property rights into the commons—upon satisfaction of a list of four factors.
5 
Myriad of activities have been successfully made a claim under this fair use doctrine; 




Although the system of copyright exceptions in the United Kingdom employs rigid 
statutory exemptions unlike the more flexible approach in the United States, judicial 
pronouncements still play a role in defining the outer limits of copyright exceptions. For 
example, in respect of the fair dealing exception, courts still have to look at the specific 
circumstances to determine whether a particular dealing is fair.
9 
4. Marital Property 
In “Treatment of marital assets: Common-law property rights and EU 
harmonization”, Anthony Dnes argues in favour of division of marital property 
according to a rebuttable presumption of division based on a mathematical formula, 
such as equal division, subject to the terms of an existing pre-nuptial agreement. The 
intuition for this insight comes from the Coase Theorem. Given low transaction cost of 
bargaining prior to marriage, parties could enter into a binding agreement on how to 
divide their marital property in the event of a divorce. If parties choose not to have a 
pre-nuptial agreement, the statutory presumption applies. Dnes argues that this is 
superior to the English approach of giving judges wide discretion in dividing marital 
property at the time of divorce. Having agreed rules of division is similar to expectation 
damages in breach of contract. Dnes nevertheless cautions that the presumption should 
apply only to new marriages when such a rule comes into force, and not retrospectively, 
so as to prevent inappropriate marital expectations which distort the incentives to 
divorce. 
If marriage contracts are relational contracts, so are labour contracts. Dnes’ 
precept about the division of marital property could equally be applicable to labour 
contracts involving creative production. When creators and innovators are involved in 
joint production with other creators or innovators, or as employees in a firm, it would 
be efficient for parties to enter into a “pre-nuptial” agreement regarding their creative 
efforts, or failing to, the law should state a default rule on division of returns from such 
                                                 
5  US Copyright Act 1976, s. 107. 
6  Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417 (1984). 
7  Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
8  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994). 
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a relation. Fortunately, the positions in copyright law and patent law with regards to 
employee’s contribution as well as point production are fairly clear, albeit one-sided. In 
English law on copyright, works of an employee in the course of employment belong to 
the employer unless agreed otherwise.
10 Likewise, a similar rule applies in the case of 
patents.
11 For creations where a contract for services—as in the case of independent 
contractors—apply, the creator-contractor is the intellectual property owner unless a 
prior agreement exists that transfers the ownership of the intellectual property to the 
contractee.
12 
5. Sleeping Owners 
In many regions of the new federal states of Germany, one can observe the 
peculiar phenomenon of dilapidated and abandoned buildings situated amidst prime 
development. These occurrences are the subject of Jurgen Backhaus’ analysis in “Failing 
property rights—The problem of sleeping owners in the city”. The author offers a few 
suggestions as to why the problem of sleeping owners occurs. These reasons include 
owners having low or zero opportunity cost of selling the property because of 
restrictions imposed on ownership, e.g. ownership of church buildings. Another is that 
some owners are holding on to properties without investing in improving them when 
the overall increase in land value due to adjacent developments outweighs the decrease 
of value due to neglect. However, Backhaus notes that such a strategy is only exercised 
by owners who face no opportunity cost of capital and no tax liability, of which one 
such example is the city or local authority itself., Based on the latter reasoning above, 
Backhaus explains that not investing in improving abandoned buildings is a form of 
negative externality on adjacent buildings when land value is depressed by the presence 
of dilapidated buildings. If the sleeping owner is the city itself, traditional policy 
solutions of zoning ordinance, public auction of delinquent property and property tax 
based on potential land rental would not be effective against the sleeping owners. 
The problem of sleeping owner parallels the problem of orphan works and 
abandonware in copyright. Orphan works and abandonware are published works still 
under copyright protection but are no longer commercially available for one reason or 
another (Khong, 2007). Although orphan works and abandonware do not impose a 
negative externality on other copyright works, society suffers because of deadweight 
losses from under-utilisation. Similar to the case of sleeping owners, the solutions to the 
orphan works problem may include a system of compulsory licensing for works no 
longer published, or a copyright exception for limited and non-commercial use, and 
annual registration and renewal system such that the registration fee encourages 
copyright owner to keep a work registered only if it profitable for him to do so. 
                                                 
10   UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 11(2). 
11 UK Patents Act 1977, s. 39. 
12 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 11(1), the exception being an equitable ownership rule 
established in R. Griggs Group Ltd. & Ors. V. Evans & Ors. [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch). 260 
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6. Intellectual Property as Property Rights 
Ugo Mattei and Andrea Pradi’s chapter on “A comparative law and economics 
perspective in the global era” is a critic of the simplistic view of property rights based on 
a particular interpretation of the Coase Theorem. According to this interpretation, a 
well-defined system of property rights will take care of externalities, since parties will 
always bargain to reach an efficient solution. Mattei and Pradi are particularly critical of 
the extension of the natural law’s property logic to the so-called intellectual property. 
Echoing similar concerns of earlier writers, they argue that the property rights logic is ill-
suited to public good character of information. Unfortunately, the authors fall short of 
offering a concrete alternative to the pre-existing paradigm. One possible solution that 
the authors might perhaps find acceptable is to temper the existing intellectual property 
law with greater state regulations—such as restricting the subject matters of protection, 
severely limiting the duration of copyright protection, mandating more compulsory 
licensing and granting more user-friendly concessions under fair use and fair dealing 
rules—in order to curb the ill-effects of monopoly power. 
Boldrin and Levine’s piece on “Intellectual property and the efficient allocation of 
social surplus from innovations” is an essay which effectively punches holes in the usual 
property rhetorics used to justify intellectual property. It is in the same vein as their 
highly acclaimed Against Intellectual Monopoly book. Boldrin and Levine are an unusual 
pair of economists who demonstrate considerable understanding and insights into 
intellectual property law. On the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
US 186 (2003), the authors successfully point out the flaws in the arguments advanced 
by the justices. For example, with regards to the equal treatment argument on 
retrospective term extensions, the authors show that it makes no economic sense once 
this argument is applied to other economic activities such as taxation. They explain that 
this argument will also not hold water in respect of copyright term reduction. 
Boldrin and Levine then turn their attention to Landes and Posner’s (2003) 
argument that intellectual property promotes not only the creation of works, but also 
maintenance of works. The latter’s thesis is that without intellectual property, there will 
be overuse of a work, such as the Mickey Mouse character, and “the value of the 
character might plummet.” Boldrin and Levine attack Landes and Posner’s 
misunderstanding of pecuniary externality. When a work such as the Mickey Mouse 
character lapses into the public domain, competition will force the market price down. 
The law of demand kicks in and consumers will consume more, or more consumers will 
have the opportunity of consuming the work. Producers of various versions of Mickey 
Mouse will instead face an externality, but this externality is merely pecuniary as its 
effect is on the price that can be extracted from the market. Consumers’ demand will be 
satisfied earlier, since it is now cheaper to enjoy Mickey Mouse, and it is this 
phenomenon that Landes and Posner inaccurately call ‘congestion’. 
Robert P. Merges takes on the question of financial services patents in “The 
uninvited guest: Patents on Wall Street”. He traces the rise of patents on financial 
services in the United States and its possible implications. He concludes with an 
optimistic note, not based on empirical evidence but on intuition, that the financial 
services sector will eventual come to terms with the existence of these patents and will 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
261
financial services sector some evolutionary good as a random and unexpected shock in 
the form of patent protection is introduced into financial sector’s humdrum ecosystem. 
At the hinterland of the property and intellectual property landscape is the 
question of the human body, which is the subject charted by Majoney and Clark in their 
article, “Property rights in human tissue”. In particular, the authors examine three 
related issues: the patenting of genetic material, compensation of tissue sources, and the 
control of tissue sources over the use of their tissue. On the subject of patenting of 
genetic material, the main thrust of the chapter is the fear that propertisation would lead 
to the tragedy of anticommons in the biomedical industry (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
The authors recount the various arguments for and against payment for human tissue, 
and conclude in favour of payment. As on the issue of control over tissue, the authors 
are in favour of restricting the right of the tissue source to order destruction of their 
removed tissue on life-saving humanitarian grounds. 
The chapter on “The ongoing copyright as an essential facility saga” by Paul 
Torremans provides a detailed account of how European competition law regulates 
intellectual property markets, particularly the market for copyrighted information. The 
chapter examines European cases concerning the essential facility doctrine and whether 
refusal to license intellectual property could amount to an abuse of dominant position.
13 
The author displays cautious optimism that the courts are taking a restrictive approach 
to the application of competition law to the legitimate exploitation of intellectual 
property. 
Finally, Harnay and Marciano in their essay titled “Intellectual property rights and 
judge-made law: An economic analysis of the production and diffusion of precedent” 
discuss the economic and social incentives in the production of judicial decisions 
outside the traditional economic incentive structure of property rights. They conclude 
that the institutional arrangements, norms and customs that govern the judicial 
community in common law countries, as well general expectation of reciprocity 
establish the conditions for the production of judge-made law. 
7. Conclusion 
The twelve articles in Property Rights Dynamics can be nicely grouped into two 
categories: those which are directly concerned with intellectual property and those 
which are not. What is interesting about the latter category is that the property rights 
principles explored therein are also applicable to intellectual property, as the discussion 
above shows. Issues such as functionality, entropy, incompleteness, relational property 
and abandonment have relevance in the theory of intellectual property. 
Another way of grouping the articles is whether they support the view of 
intellectual property as a property rights. Boldrin and Levine’s article is clearly in the 
‘anti’ camp. Mattei and Pradi, and to some extent, Merges as well as Torremans’ articles 
can be read as providing a weak support of that view. In this respect, two things are 
noteworthy when discussing the economics of intellectual property. The first is that 
                                                 
13 The cases discussed are Maxicar v. Renault [1990] 4 CMNLR 265; Volvo v. Veng [1989] 4 CMLR 122; 
Magill’s case [1995] 4 CMLR 718; Ladbroke v. European Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309; IMS Health v. 
NDC Health [2004] 4 CMLR 1543; and, the Microsoft case. 262 
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monopoly rights associated with intellectual property are broader than the exclusionary 
rights associated with physical property. In this sense, intellectual property is 
monopolistic in nature. Secondly, notwithstanding that intellectual property laws enable 
various forms of commercial dealing in the intellectual property, intellectual property is 
intrinsically different from other traditional forms of property such as land, as use of 
intellectual property is non-rivalrous in nature. With this in mind, there are strong 
justifications on welfare grounds to limit the property rights in intellectual property, 
either by restricting the scope or subject matter of intellectual property, or by using 
competition law to regulate the conduct of owners when exploiting intellectual property. 
Property Rights Dynamics is a worthy reference for scholars interested in property 
rights and intellectual property rights. As is usual in a collection of this nature, some 
articles are more readable than others. Nevertheless, the diverse background and 
philosophical approaches taken by the contributors give this book an overall interesting 
mix. It is worth noting that the editors have also successfully kept spelling and stylistic 
mistakes to a minimum. 
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